PUBLIC BETALive on Solana mainnet. Program audited by CertiK. Start small.Know the limits
VERIFY, THEN TRUST

Nothing hidden behind a badge.

The program on mainnet, the source it was built from, and who can change it.

Deployment facts

Reading configured deployment status…

Executable status is an RPC observation. A public rebuild means a service outside this project built the named commit and got the program that is on chain; it says nothing about whether that code is correct, and it is not an audit.

Source and reproducibility

The complete web app, small Rust custody program, browser SDK, test vectors, and deployment instructions are included in the source bundle. Builds use committed npm and Cargo lockfiles. A successful local build is not independently verified deployment evidence.

The program on mainnet

01

Program

DGXACBwbUqRKRVR1TQojZBoRuV2TZJ8wVnQSuLKm2nJJ

02

Built from

Commit 9bb0856 of the public repository, in the pinned container. Live since the upgrade of 19 October 2026: the program code of commit f6a37ce plus one change, which refuses a withdrawal announcement the vault cannot pay.

03

Executable hash

161e6b4caac746dc35115910c2b4d50fe319b97d5a3a4ec39f9b6350adf14518

04

Upgrade authority

None. It was renounced on 19 October 2026, so the program can never be changed.

05

Audit

Done, by CertiK, published 20 October 2026: the program and its signature verifier at commit f6a37ce. No critical, high or medium issues. Of its four findings, three are resolved and one is acknowledged. The one code fix is the change in commit 9bb0856 above. A bug bounty is open.

What has been checked, and by whom

Checked by the project, not by anyone independent: the executable hash above was produced three times from that commit, twice by the public CI and once on a separate machine, and it equals the hash of the program read back from mainnet. The program’s test suite passes against that exact binary.

Checked by a public service: before the upgrade key was renounced, it recorded on chain which commit the program was built from, and the public verified-builds service rebuilt that commit and got the program that is on chain. That shows the code on chain is the code in the repository. It does not show the code is correct.

Independently audited: the program and its signature verifier, by CertiK. Read the report. The site’s own code, the offline tool and the command-line client were not part of that audit and have had no outside review.

Check it yourself

Reproduce the build and compare its executable hash to the program on chain using the Solana verified-build workflow: solana-verify build --library-name bunker3 at that commit, then solana-verify get-program-hash for the program address. Read the program-data account for the upgrade authority. An Explorer link alone establishes neither source equivalence nor audit coverage.

The browser extension

Bunker Watch is read-only and holds no keys. This is the build this site serves. Compare the hash before you load it, and treat any store listing not named here as someone else’s.

Reading the published build…

What the site will and will not do

On mainnet this site, the offline tool and the command-line client send transactions to that one program address and to no other; no environment setting can change which. The program has no upgrade authority, so a matching hash describes it for good.